

IAC-D-17

4 April 1951

CENSUS AND VERIFICATION OF  
ALL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS

The attached paper was received from the State Department, which requested a coordinated answer from the intelligence agencies. It is proposed to undertake this project as a Special Estimate. The matter will be discussed at the next IAC meeting.

Secretary  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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Assuming that a continuing census and verification of all armed forces\* and armaments, including atomic weapons, of the United States and the USSR were undertaken on a phased basis as the first step of an agreed international system for control, regulation, and limitation of armed forces\* and armaments, including atomic energy activities (but recognizing that the agreed international system may never be implemented because the Soviet Union might in bad faith either not comply fully with or renege on its agreement in any stage of the implementation):

a. What are the relative advantages to the United States and to the USSR, from the intelligence point of view, of an inspection and verification of their respective atomic energy positions:

- (1) With respect to the present?
- (2) With respect to a period 5-10 years hence?

b. What would be the nature and extent of the verification procedure:

- (1) What should be the phases of the inspection of atomic energy activities? The following phases have

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\* including para-military, internal security, and police forces.

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been suggested: mines, refining processes, production facilities, and stockpiles. Would you recommend any changes therein?

(2) What phases would you recommend for the inspection and verification of armed forces and other armaments?

(3) Should research and development activities for either or both b(1) and b(2) above be included in the census and verification system?

c. What would be the probable advantages and disadvantages to the United States, from the intelligence point of view, of the data that might be secured during each phase of the census and verification of atomic energy activities? Of armed forces and of other armaments?

d. What would be the probable advantages and disadvantages to the USSR, from the intelligence point of view, of the data that might be secured during each phase of the census and verification of atomic energy activities? Of armed forces and of other armaments?

e. What would be the nature of the inspection that you would recommend to obtain the various kinds of data?

f. What advantages could we expect to accrue to the United States from the collateral intelligence that might be obtained in the course of the implementation of a system of inspection and verification?

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g. On balance, from the intelligence point of view, what are your recommendations as to the United States position with respect to census and verification as the first step of an agreed international system for control, regulation, and limitation of armed forces and armaments?

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